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Pandemic Policymaking
Philip D. Waggoner
Abstract: This study leverages a high dimensional manifold learning design to explore the latent structure of the pandemic
policymaking space only based on bill-level characteristics of pandemic-focused bills from 1973 to 2020. Results indicate the
COVID-19 era of policymaking maps extremely closely onto prior periods of related policymaking. This suggests that there
is striking uniformity in Congressional policymaking related to these types of large-scale crises over time, despite currently
operating in a unique era of hyperpolarization, division, and ineffective governance.
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Introduction

COVID-19 has rattled the world with far reaching
consequences from social[1] and political[2] , to
epidemiological[3]
and
emotional[4] .
Though
unprecedented on a number of dimensions, such
large-scale societal crises require formalized responses
to protect the vulnerable and needy in society. In the
American context when epidemics like COVID-19
occur, the clearest avenue for action that affects the
broadest slice of the population is governmental action.
The government, empowered by the constitution as
well as the representational responsibility of political
elites to respond to constituents[5] , has the duty to act
for the people by protecting, providing, and serving
in some capacity, especially when the country is
facing a common threat, which currently is COVID-19.
Governmental action can take many forms, such as
court rulings, resource provision to frontline workers,
military intervention, or support to those who need it
most. While manifestations of governmental action
vary, the most common avenue through which such
large-scale governmental action takes shape, or is
possible, is through policymaking. That is, writing
legislation and passing bills into law reflects the
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government’s prime means of action, distribution of
resources, and mobilization of a unified response\ . In
sum, policymaking by elected officials in Congress is
one of the clearest avenues for governmental action, and
especially in times of crisis.
COVID-19 is not the first large-scale crisis in America
requiring a consolidated governmental response. Indeed
many crises, both public health related and otherwise,
have littered America’s past, from HIV/AIDS and the
opioid epidemic, to urban crime, climate change, and
public education. Yet, though the subject of the crisis
might vary, there are several common threads underlying
crises: (1) they affect a large portion of the population
in some way (e.g., they are not geographically isolated),
(2) the effects are negative in some measurable way,
and (3) they require governmental policymaking to offer
solutions, resources, and support to mitigate their effects.
The result is that these large-scale crises rise to the level
of an “epidemic” or “pandemic”, depending on the scope
of the issue} .
Yet, the current climate of policymaking is different
today than it was even a few decades ago. Though
government need and responsibility have remained
unchanged, the context and institution allowing for
action through policymaking have drastically changed
in several ways. Of note, the major political parties
\

This is most simply seen through the Constitutional provision
for Congress to “hold the purse strings” as it relates to monetary
appropriations for governmental action[6] . This monetary control
and disbursement take shape through policymaking, e.g., passing
the federal budget bill.
}
Use of these terms is discussed at length in Section 2.
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are extremely polarized and ideologically distinct[7, 8] ;
the country, comprised of a voting electorate, is
deeply politically fractured[9] ; driven largely by political
activism, the alignment between the two major American
political parties (Democrat and Republican) and the
two major political ideologies (liberal and conservative)
is stronger now than ever before[10] ; enactment of
major rule changes has altered fundamental institutional
processes, deepening elite political division[11] ; and
Congressional policymaking is increasingly negative and
intense[12] . These recent developments suggest America
is experiencing a unique political period, at both the elite
and mass levels.
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the relatively
common occurrence of epidemics throughout American
history, and the current era of hyper-polarization and
division, a question emerges: Is policymaking in
response to COVID-19, which is occurring in this
divided era, substantively different from policymaking in
response to similar epidemics in the past? This question
assumes that the occurrence of epidemics as well as the
need for governmental response through policymaking
are both constant. The question, then, centers on the
nature of policymaking and how it is currently taking
shape, compared to recent history. There are a couple of
ways that one could approach addressing such a question:
causal, requiring theoretical innovation and development
of testable expectations; or exploratory, where nothing
is assumed of the drivers of patterns in the data, seeking
instead to learn from natural structure underlying the
data.
In a recent paper, Ref. [12] addressed a similar
question using an exploratory framework: Has
governmental policymaking in response to epidemics
and pandemics evolved, or are we witnessing a unique
period of policymaking in the era of COVID-19? To
explore this question, Ref. [12] built and mined a set
of the text data comprised of long bill titles, which
act as summaries and signals of the bill sponsor’s
intent. Results suggest that while the topics of epidemicrelated bills historically remain focused on epidemics
at respective moments in time (and are thus not
“evolutionary”), the general sentiment, or the “how”
of the bills has substantially evolved, growing in
both positive and negative sentiment over time. The
increasingly intense tone defining the policymaking
approach on these consequential, yet apolitical issues
suggests the current COVID-19 era is indeed a distinct
period of policymaking. Intensity and extremism
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are used to characterize proposed legislation in the
current COVID-19 period, which is a marked shift from
historical approaches to policymaking on similar issues.
Yet a limitation of Ref. [12] is in the unit of
analysis. While bill titles are useful mechanisms for
“bill branding”, they are nonetheless a biased look
at policymaking. In addition to numerous players
contributing to crafting legislation (e.g., party leadership,
multiple prime sponsors, and special interest groups),
legislators themselves are inherently biased actors who
have unique bases of support[13] , political agendas to
realize while in office[14] , a party brand to maintain and
support[15] , party leadership to satisfy[16] , and unique
career concerns[17] . Further, legislators are ranked and
rated by many special interest groups based on their
policy portfolios[18, 19] , suggesting they may be biased[20]
or at least influenced to write a bill that does not
purely address the epidemic or issue in question, while
instead posturing to obtain a better rating. In short,
while the bill title is a useful summary and signal of
the policy, and thus a good starting place to explore
the historical contours of pandemic policymaking, this
approach remains a tainted signal of a broader pattern of
Congressional policymaking.
Beyond picking up on the limitation of Ref. [12], though
similarly motivated by the representational arrangement
between policymakers and constituents[5, 21] , this
research is more broadly interested in placing COVID-19
policymaking into historical context. Indeed, citizens of
a representative democracy rightly expect policymakers
who have been elected to serve an electing population
to respond to large-scale issues like COVID-19.
And accordingly, one of the most common avenues
for responsiveness by Congressional lawmakers is
proposing and passing legislation, however tainted it
may be, to address a problem from a variety of angles.
Building on the growing body of research on
COVID-19 and policymaking[22–24] , and specifically
the evolutionary question of pandemic policymaking
explored in Ref. [12], I approach this question from a
different angle, but using the same dataset as Ref. [12].
I am interested in whether patterns of policymaking are
distinct or not. Put differently, are characteristics of bills
addressing epidemics throughout recent history similar
or different in meaningful ways? “Meaningful ways”
in this context refer to structural similarity between
the pre-COVID and COVID periods, e.g., similar or
different cosponsor configurations and committee paths.
The goal here is to understand patterns of pandemic
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policymaking, but from an institutional perspective,
where characteristics of proposed bills without the text
itself reveal structural characteristics of the institutions
in which these actors are acting. By exploring these
patterns, whether similar or not, a deeper understanding
of pandemic policymaking is possible.
In this exploration, I leverage unsupervised manifold
learning to uncover the structure of policymaking on all
bills related to epidemics from the 93rd to the 116th
Congress . To do so, I employ Uniform Manifold
Approximation and Projection (UMAP) to explore
pandemic policymaking, and so recover to the latent
manifold of this space. As I am interested in the
characteristics of the bills, rather than the text of the
bill, I rely only on bill-level metadata (e.g., cosponsors,
party of primary sponsor, committee assignments, etc.).
My goal, then, is to understand whether characteristics
of bills on similar topics are stable over time, or whether
they shift in detectable ways. If stable, then this
would suggest we are not witnessing a unique period
in policymaking during COVID-19, as the manifolds
would map well onto each other. On the other hand,
if the structure is unstable and shifting over time, then
this would suggest that the current era of COVID-19
policymaking is indeed unique, relative to historical
policymaking on similar issues.
After several stages, final results point to remarkable
stability in the pandemic policymaking space, such
that the current COVID-19 era maps extremely closely
onto prior periods. Indeed, the manifolds are nearly
identical, based on bill characteristics after accounting
for time. This suggests that there is less of an
“evolutionary trend” in pandemic policymaking, where
instead there is striking uniformity in this type of
Congressional policymaking, despite currently operating
an era of hyperpolarization[25] , deepening mass
political polarization[26] , and ineffective governance[27] .
Implications of these findings and next steps are
discussed in the concluding remarks.

2

Empirical Strategy

As this project is interested in uncovering latent structure
in a common space, but with no expected outcome,
this is an unsupervised problem. Further, I assume that
configurations of pandemic-related bill metadata should


As addressed and justified below, and in line with
Ref. [12], I use “epidemic” and “pandemic” as policy
heuristics interchangeably throughout, allowing for crosstemporal comparability.
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reflect substantive patterns of aggregate policymaking,
and thus point to institutional characteristics underlying
pandemic policymaking. Such an assumption, in
technical terms, is that these observations (bills) lie on
a common manifold, and are thus structurally related.
While this manifold need not be fully connected, such
that each bill to every other bill along the manifold,
the expectation rather is that the bills come from a
common space, which mirrors reality. Put differently,
there is a common data generating process, where all
legislators whose author bills are acting in a common
space, under common constraints, and on average, have a
largely common set of goal as they author legislation[28] .
Taken together, the unsupervised nature of the task
and the assumption of a common manifold underlying
these pandemic policies, the core assumption of this
project is that there is latent, non-random underlying
the pandemic policymaking space. The task, then, is
to recover this manifold, and then compare versions of
it over time, to address whether periods of pandemic
policy are similar or different. As this is an exploratory
project, results revealing either similarity in contours
of pandemic policymaking or not, will nonetheless
deepen an understanding on aggregate elite approaches
to responding to major, national crises.
Importantly, the terms “pandemic” and “epidemic”
often refer to instances of disease outbreak, with the
former being widerly spread than the latter[29] . Yet,
Ref. [12] demonstrated that when a wide array of
problems, disease or otherwise, become widespread
and capture national or international attention, these
types of problems are often branded as “epidemics”
by policymakers. As such, in this research I also use
these terms as policy heuristics for widespread problems
requiring governmental action at some level. Indeed, use
of the word “pandemic” is largely unique to COVID-19
in the context of American policymaking, as politicians
do not typically author legislation on international
issues. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic, though ultimately
unparalleled in scope and impact, is related to other
more commonly dubbed “epidemics” in America, such
as the opioid epidemic or the HIV/AIDS epidemic in
the 1980s, both affecting the nation and thus requiring
governmental policymaking responses. As such, the
loose definition of the terms found in Ref. [12] is
based more on a policy-focused heuristic, rather than
a formal public health definition. I follow the same logic
in this research, and use “pandemic” and “epidemic”
interchangeably to allow for a collection of a set of
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policies that are generally comparable over a long period
of time.
2.1

Data

The data were scraped from congress.gov, and include
all bills related to epidemics introduced in the American
Congress from 1973 to May, 2020[12] . The data include
several bill-level features: the chamber in which the
bill was introduced (House or Senate), the canonical
designation of the bill (e.g., resolution, joint resolution,
bill, and concurrent resolution) , the Congress (two-year
period) in which the bill was introduced ranging from
the 93rd (1973–1974) to the first half of the 116th (2019–
2020), the date of bill introduction, long bill title, the
party of the prime sponsor, the representing state of
the prime sponsor, the representing district of the prime
sponsor‘ , number of cosponsors on the bill (non-negative
integer), configuration of committees in which the bill
was readk , the date of last action, and finally the last
action (e.g., read in committee or signed into law).
The data are split into two periods for exploration: preCOVID (1973–2018) and COVID (2019–2020). Time is
explicitly addressed in a later stage below.
Importantly, these features are included in the data
set, and thus make sense for this type of exploration,
as they comprise the information the modal member
of Congress consumes as they pick up and read a
bill. That is, they are able to see who sponsored a
bill, their party, the bill’s cosponsors, the committees
of reference, the chamber, and district of the sponsor,
when it was sponsored, and so on. And from a practical
perspective, these features include all available metadata
at the bill level. Thus, the goal here is to, as closely
as possible, emulate and capture the process of filtering
Congressional legislation for the purpose of recovering
the structure of this process for comparative value. So,
from this full feature space, I focus on the features that
can be included in the specification, which is a subset
(e.g., raw text cannot yet be reliably treated in UMAP
applications): bill type, committee configuration for
 It is important to note that naming conventions vary by
chamber. For example, a resolution might be a declaration of an
idea, whereas a bill might be more substantive.
‘ dist D 08Senate
kThis could be a single committee or many. For example, HB
6311 in the 116th Congress, Care for COVID-19 Act, was read
in three committees (Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means,
Education and Labor), whereas HB 6623, COVID-19 Language
Access Act, from the same Congress was only read in a single
committee (Oversight and Reform).
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each bill, state of prime sponsor, chamber of prime
sponsor, date of introduction, and date of final action.
Party of the prime sponsor is omitted to allow for
conditioning visualizations of the lower dimensional
space on party to understand whether the lower
dimensional manifold finds any discernable differences
between policymaking on a partisan basis. This decision
makes results more substantively interpretable. For
example, we can understand that Republican bills may be
different Democratic bills, whereas bill-level differences
represented by black dots in a two-dimensional setting
are less clear.
2.2

UMAP

UMAP[30] is a recent approach to dimension reduction,
which is particularly well suited for high dimensional
contexts. As in other dimension reduction approaches,
such as Principal Components Analysis (PCA), the
goal is to make a complex, high dimensional space
more interpretable and manageable by intentionally
discarding some information for the benefit of homing
in on the most interesting variation that characterizes
the data well. UMAP, though, joins this common
statistical learning approach to dimension reduction
with a formal mathematical foundation based on
topological data analysis/graph theory (e.g., simplicial
subspaces) and manifold learning. The result is a
scalable, computationally efficient (extremely fast),
and mathematically grounded approach to dimension
reduction. The goal of UMAP, then, is to learn a lower
dimensional version of the data (i.e., low dimensional
embedding, as in PCA), but it assumes the data exist
along a common manifold. If the manifold is recovered,
a better, but more parsimonious understanding of the
data can also be recovered.
UMAP finds a lower dimensional manifold, wij , that
captures both local structure in such a way that retains
spatial relationships among observations i and j (via
d.i; j /, where d./ is some measure of distance) in
the original high dimensional setting, vij . The goal is
to do this, but while also retaining global structure to
understand the full shape of the manifold. Compared
to PCA, which seeks only to maximize variance in the
raw data space to give a lower dimensional summary
of that space, UMAP accomplishes retention of both
global and local structure. UMAP does so by minimizing
information loss across the high (vij ) and low (wij )
dimensional versions of the data by optimizing a crossentropy cost function,
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(1)

The full cost function in Formula (1) can be rearranged
into two components, which are typically optimized by
[30]
stochastic
Xgradient descent ,
vij log.vij / C .1 vij /log.1 vij /
i ¤j

vij log.wij /

.1

vij /log.1

wij /

(2)

As such, the goal is to minimize the differences of
local and global structure in the raw high-dimensional
setting, vij , and the lower dimensional manifold, wij .
To underscore the graph-based approach of searching
for an optimal manifold that underlies, and thus connects
points that lie along it (i.e., a graph), the task can be
reframed as one that searches at each point for the nearest
neighbor. Once found, the neighbors are connected
by an edge in a smooth way, such that the density of
some region determines the decay, which moves outward
from the observation, i . In other words, higher density
regions in ambient (secondary) space have smaller radii
around each point, compared to less dense regions,
which have wider radii of decay. This fuzzy, secondary
search (beyond the primary nearest neighbors search) is
required for the manifold to connect. The secondary
search satisfies a previously mentioned assumption
that all points exist along a common manifold, though
are not necessarily locally connected. For example,
there could exist several locally-connected simplicies
(connections between multiple vertices) found in the first
nearest neighbors search, but not globally connected to
each other. Thus, the secondary search region allowing
varying radii 8i 2 f1; : : : ; N g, globally connects all
points, which may or may not be fully connected after
the first search. As such, the cost function can be rewritten in graph notation as




X
1 wh .e/
wh .e/
wh .e/log
.1 wh .e//log
wl .e/
1 wl .e/
e2G
(3)
where e are the edges contained in graph G, wh .e/ is the
weighted edge in the high dimensional setting, and wl .e/
is the weighted edge in thelow dimensional
setting. The

X
wh .e/
first term,
wh .e/ log
, allows for optimal
wl .e/
e2G
recovery of the localneighborhoods,
 and the second
1 wh .e/
term, .1 wh .e// log
, allows for optimal
1 wl .e/
recovery of the spacing between the local neighborhoods,
thus allowing for consistent global structure, based on
consistent local structure.

The term “consistent” points to vastly important aspect
of UMAP, which is major improvement over t-distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE[31] ).

 That is,
X
wh .e/
the first term in Formula (3),
wh .e/ log
,
wl .e/
e2G
is the goal of t-SNE, which is to capture local
behavior to give a global representation of the data
space. Yet, t-SNE does so in a probabilistic way, by
drawing miniature t-distributions around each point,
and calculating the probability that a certain number
of points should be nearest neighbors, with some degree
of uncertainty. Without
 the second
 term in Formula
1 wh .e/
(3), .1 wh .e// log
, t-SNE is unable to
1 wl .e/
project new data onto the lower dimensional embedding,
as the lower dimensional embedding can change at each
iteration, and is thus not reproducible.
As such, a major advantage of UMAP over t-SNE and
other manifold-based dimension reduction techniques,
is the ability to reproduce the same lower dimensional
embedding, thereby opening up the possibility of
supervised projection of new points onto the learned
manifold. I take advantage of this feature in the
second stage below, to directly compare pre-COVID
policymaking with COVID-era policymaking.
It is important to note that while t-SNE finds nearest
neighbors by calculating a series of N pointwise
conditional probability distributions, similarity in the
context of UMAP, thus defining nearest neighbor, vj ji ,
is calculated by a measure of smoothed nearest neighbor
distances based on spatial proximity to each other, e.g.,
vj ji D expŒ. d.i; j / i /=i 
(4)
where i is the minimum distance to the nearest point,
and i is a normalization factor controlling smoothness.
These hyperparameters affect the smoothness of the
solution[30] . In practice, tuning these hyperparameters
affects the tradeoff between local and global structure,
in addition to several other hyperparameters discussed
more in the following subsection.
2.3

Hyperparameter tuning

There are five major hyperparameters that must be tuned
when applying UMAP to a dimension reduction task
of this sort: k (the number of neighbors considered in
each neighborhood search), i (the minimum distance
to the nearest point), number of epochs (number of
times the algorithm sees the data), m (which is the
number of dimensions (usually 2) constraining the lower
dimensional embedding), and d (distance metric for
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pairwise distance calculations).
As with many learning algorithms, a common
approach to home in on final values for the
hyperparameters is to conduct a grid search across
some sequence of values of each hyperparameter for
all unique hyperparameters associated with the given
learning model. I take this approach in the research, but
present the results across the two main hyperparameters,
neighborhood size k and number of epochs in Fig. 1.
From Fig. 1, a few patterns stand out. Firstly, as
expected, the more the algorithm sees the data (as the
number of epochs increases), the clearer and more stable
the patterns in the lower dimensional manifold become.
Moving from left to right across the column facets in
Fig. 1, the separation between smaller subgroups in the
data becomes starker. This suggests that there may be
differences in pandemic policymaking over the full study
period, which are explored in the analysis that follows.
A second notable pattern in the grid search in Fig. 1 is
that moving from top to bottom across the row facets as
the size of the neighborhood increases from 5 (top row)
to 45 (bottom row), additional clarity is gained.
Inspecting the highest values from each of these
hyperparameter values in the lower right plot in Fig. 1,
it becomes increasingly clear that two distinct groups of
50

150

pandemic-related policies take shape. Precisely, what
these groups are and how they are comprised are the task
of the later stages of analysis below.
It is worth pointing out that the features have been
scaled and standardized, meaning the axis values have
no substantive meaning, as in other similar dimension
reduction techniques like Locally Linear Embedding
(LLE) or t-SNE. Therefore, the greatest strength of these
types of manifold-based dimension reduction techniques
is to visualize the reduced data space, which allows for
greater insight into substantive differences that naturally
exist in the higher dimensional space. Here, the first
conclusion we can draw from the single Fig. 1 is
that there seem to be two groups of pandemic-policies
characterizing this space. I transition now to pull this
apart more overtly, by proceeding with hyperparameter
values k D 45, number of epochs D 450, d D 2, dist D
Euclidean, and  D 0:1.

3

Learning
Manifold
Policymaking

of

Pandemic

I first present the results in Fig. 2 from fitting UMAP
to the COVID period of policymaking. Point colors
correspond with the party of the prime sponsor on the
bill. This condition allows for understanding whether
250

350

450

20
5
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0
−10
20
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10
0

20
10

25

Second dimension

−10

0

−10
20
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10
0
−10
20
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0
−10
−20

−10

0

10

20 −20

−10

0

10

20 −20

−10

0

10

20 −20

−10

0

10

20 −20

−10

0

10

20

First dimension

Fig. 1
sizes.

Grid search of UMAP hyperparameters. Here, columns represent number of epochs, and rows represent neighborhood
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COVID
Neighborhood size: 45; number of epochs = 450

Second dimension

5

Party
Democratic
Ind
Republican
0

−5

−6

−3

0

3

6

First dimension

Fig. 2

COVID policymaking structure.

partisan differences exist in pandemic policymaking, in
addition to the vector of additional features on which the
UMAP fit is based.
Building on the patterns from the grid search in Fig. 1,
it seems as though the distant cluster of points, apart
from the “C”-shaped cluster, is the COVID period. As
the key value of UMAP, and visualization of this sort is
to observe where observations lie in high dimensional
space, as recovered in a lower dimensional setting, the
main takeaway from Fig. 2 is that there seems to be
a distant pocket of Democratic (blue) bills, with only
a few Republican bills in the upper left of the plot,
which is distant from the remainder of the policies in
the lower right of the plot. In the lower right, there is a
blend of Democratic (blue) and Republican (red) bills
mixed together, implying, for the most part, there are no
major differences between the parties in the approach
pandemic policymaking. While the distant group of
mostly Democratic bills to the upper left is interesting,
explicit probing of that group is beyond the scope of this
analysis. Rather, I am interested in exploring whether
differences exist across the two major time periods of
pandemic policymaking. To this end, I turn now to
present results from the UMAP fit on the pre-COVID set

of policies, as shown in Fig. 3.
Here, we can confirm the “C”-shaped cluster of points
is the pre-COVID era of policymaking. The distribution
of political parties in this cluster over a long period
of time is relatively uniform, with no major partisan
differences emerging.
Of note, though, is the unique shape of the cluster,
compared to the COVID period in Fig. 2. It seems as
though the structure is more clearly segmented, with
those existing in a given cluster (e.g., the first group in
the lower left of the plot) being explicitly in that cluster,
compared to the rest of the space, which is also clearly
and explicitly grouped. In sum, this suggests that there
is some aspect of this policymaking space that clearly
sorts policies into bins that do not blend for the most
part.
Stepping back and comparing trends across the
COVID (Fig. 2) and pre-COVID (Fig. 3) periods, the
patterns in the data seem to suggest that these periods
of pandemic policymaking are indeed distinct. This
gives credence to the notion that we are witnessing a
truly unique moment in American policymaking, where
political elites are engaging in policymaking in some
fundamentally different way than ever before.
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Pre-COVID
Neighborhood size: 45; number of epochs = 450
10

Second dimension

5

0

Party
Democratic
Ind
Republican

−5

−10

−10

−5

0

5

10

First dimension

Fig. 3

4

An Alternative Approach:
Projection

Pre-COVID policymaking structure.

Supervised

At this point on visual inspection of the two periods of
pandemic policymaking, it seems as though the periods
are structurally distinct. Further, there seems to be a
lack of clear partisan distinction between the periods,
resulting in a lot of party overlap across both periods
on average. Exploration has centered on observation
and comparison of patterns in a descriptive way, given
the nature (and limitations) of unsupervised dimension
reduction.
Yet, recall that one of the prime benefits of UMAP
is to learn a lower dimensional representation of the
data that retains and balances global and local structure
in a reproducible way given the lack of reliance on a
probabilistic neighbor search. In practice, this feature
of a reproducible solution from a UMAP fit allows for
supervised dimension reduction, where new data can be
projected onto the learned manifold, allowing for direct
comparison between the two sets of data. If there is
stability in the structure across the sets of data, then the

learned manifold is likely capturing true, unique features
of the data, such that new, unseen data can be mapped
closely onto that manifold. Yet, if there is a lack of
structure in the space, then the learned manifold will be
different from the manifold found when mapping new
data to it.
For current purposes, this powerful benefit of UMAP
allows for a direct comparison of the two eras of
policymaking beyond simple visual exploration of two
UMAP fits. As such, I turn now to fit UMAP on the preCOVID era and learn the shape of the manifold. Then, I
project the COVID era data onto the learned manifold
from the pre-COVID era. In so doing, I treat the preCOVID data as “training” data and the COVID data as
“testing” data.
UMAP results on the full feature space are presented
in Fig. 4. All features from the previous fits are
included. “O” points represent the learned manifold from
the training/pre-COVID set. “X” points represent the
projection of the test/COVID period.
This view of the two periods is in line with findings
to this point, where the COVID period (denoted by
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D 3
I 1
R 2

D 3 (X = covid)
I 1 (X = covid)
R 2 (X = covid)

Fig. 4

Projecting COVID onto pre-COVID period.

the green box) seems to be a very unique period of
policymaking different from nearly every other period in
pandemic policymaking. This is seen by the tiny position
of COVID onto the full manifold, suggesting it projects
very poorly onto this space.
If the COVID period were truly different from the preCOVID period, then we might expect to see the COVID
period project poorly onto the manifold from the preCOVID period, e.g., a cluster of points distant from the
main cluster of the pre-COVID period, which would be
different from the pattern in the grid search in Fig. 1,
as the grid search was not based on projection. Yet, we
see the COVID period clearly projecting onto a very
small, but specific part of the manifold learned from the
pre-COVID era.
Note the spacing of the clusters of bills along the
manifold in Fig. 4. There are explicit gaps in the
manifold, suggesting clear separation in the projection
space. Combined with the pattern in Fig. 3 that precise,
but still distinct clusters of policies clearly spread out in
the same space, the inclusion of time-dependent features
seems to be influencing the structure of the manifold,

and thus projection of the distribution of points along
it. This is likely the case, because for example, bills
sponsored in 1980 will be treated very differently than
bills sponsored in 2020 merely due to their different
values along this feature. The same is true for other
time-dependent features, like the Congressional period
feature, which is treated as a non-negative integer (e.g.,
ranging from 93 to 116).
To explore whether this is the case and time is
influencing the shape of the learned manifold, I turn
now to fit a new version of UMAP on a subset of the
feature space, excluding all time-dependent features.
We are left with five features, still withholding party
affiliation to allow for conditioning the color of points:
bill type, cosponsors, committee configurations, state
of primary sponsor, and the chamber of the primary
sponsor. Though significantly pairing down the space,
we are still left with a “high dimensional” problem, as we
are considering a five-dimensional feature space, which
on its own is substantively uninterpretable compared at
least to a two-dimensional version of the same space.
Upon learning the lower dimensional manifold of
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the pre-COVID period (this time minus time-dependent
features), I project the COVID period onto the manifold
to explore whether and to what degree the manifolds
align. Results are presented in Fig. 5, where again, “O’s”
are pre-COVID bills, “X’s” are COVID bills projected
onto the space, and colors vary by party of the prime bill
sponsor.
We now get a very different view of the pandemic
policymaking space. Considering the role of time by
dropping the time-dependent features from the fit, the
patterns of pre-COVID and COVID map extremely
closely on each other. Substantively, this suggests that
the two periods, spanning a near 50-year period of
Congressional policymaking, look very similar to each
other. Further, the structure shrinks as well, with the
“C”-shape of the manifold disappearing, and the precise
grouping (presumably by time) from the earlier patterns
in Figs. 3 and 4, now disappearing as well. If the COVID
period of policymaking were truly unique, we might
expect poor projection and no evidence of clear mapping
across the periods, regardless of time. Yet, as shown
in Fig. 5, the configuration of pandemic-sponsoring
legislators look quite similar to each other over time
where nearly all “X’s” are plotted on top of nearly all
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“O’s.”
From these results, as they are exploratory, it is
impossible to say whether the patterns we see today
are a function of the historical approach to pandemic
policymaking. Target causal methods would be required
for such a conclusion. But what is very clear from
these results is that not much has changed over 50
years regarding how legislators approach pandemic
policymaking, and thus how the institution processes
pandemic-related legislation.
Even though the choice of setting the pre-COVID era
as the training set and the COVID era as the testing
set was substantively motivated, to directly compare
the patterns of pandemic policymaking across the two
periods, I offer a final check on these patterns in this
section. To do so, and thus validate the patterns found
thus far, particularly those in Fig. 5, I randomly split the
full data space into training and testing sets, regardless of
whether policies were from the COVID or pre-COVID
periods. Note, I retain the same proportion of bills in
each major period for direct comparison ( 0:66 in
the training/pre-COVID set and  1 0:66 in the
testing/COVID set). Further, based on the findings
showing striking similarity across the periods in Fig. 5,
D 3
I 1
R 2

D 3 (X = covid)
I 1 (X = covid)
R 2 (X = covid)

Fig. 5

Projecting COVID onto pre-COVID period: Addressing time-related features.
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here I also exclude time-specific features (e.g., Congress
period, date of introduction). Results are presented in
Fig. 6.
In Fig. 6, as before, patterns are extremely similar
with the projection of a random set of test points
mapping closely onto the manifold learned from the
training set. This strengthens the patterns from the
previous section that the two periods of pandemic
policymaking are virtually indistinguishable as it relates
to partisan patterns, committee configurations of bills,
cosponsorship, and so on for all features included in the
model. Ultimately, this suggests that though we are in a
current period of hyperpolarization and political division,
institutional structure for processing policies in response
to pandemics is a relatively stable phenomenon. This
conclusion, though made on the basis of an exploratory
study, provides a glimmer of hope in a current American
political climate marked by bitter division and dislike
for members of opposing political parties, such that
when crisis strikes, politicians seem to have an informal
code of policymaking. This code seems to be closely
adhered to over a near 50-year period of pandemic
policymaking. That is, these results suggest that perhaps

Fig. 6

there is some evidence against polarization as it relates
to this specific expression of policymaking. Regardless
of the many legislators who have passed through the
chamber and have been in charge over the years, the
stability and consistency in how the institution as a
whole handles policy of such a grave magnitude offers
perhaps a glimmer of hope. Though implications are of
course subject to interpretation, the stability in structure
is noteworthy.

5

Concluding Remark

In this paper, I set out to explore and uncover the
lower dimensional manifold of American policymaking
related to epidemics and pandemics broadly defined.
In so doing, a second order goal was to understand
whether the unique institutional context of political
division and polarization also influence the policies
aimed at addressing COVID-19. By focusing on
COVID-19 and institutional structure, the concept of
pandemic policymaking places COVID-19 legislation
into historical context. The result is a comparison of
patterns of policymaking over time, to explore whether
past approaches to epidemic-related policymaking

D

1 (X = test set)

I

3 (X = test set)

R

2 (X = test set)

Pandemic policymaking structure with random data split.

D

1

I

3

R

2
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map onto the current approach of policymaking on
COVID-19.
Though the initial stages of the exploration seemed
to suggest that the current era of COVID-19 pandemic
policymaking is distinct from prior periods, a more
targeted exploration showed that once explicitly
accounting for time, COVID-19 policymaking mapped
extremely closely onto prior periods of pandemic and
epidemic-related policymaking. This suggests, then,
that though the political and institutional contexts have
changed, becoming increasingly bitter and divided, the
approaches and patterns of pandemic policymaking have
remained largely stable over time. The substantive
conclusion, then, is that the current era of COVID19 policymaking looks very similar to prior eras of
policymaking on a host of epidemics, all at varying
scales, perhaps implying a degree of (restored) hope
in the prime institution for policymaking in America.
Indeed, a more stable, and perhaps even formulaic
approach seems to characterize Congressional pandemic
policymaking, regardless of the surrounding political
and institutional context as well as the nature and
scope of the epidemic(s) in question. These patterns
were corroborated using random data splitting and then
replicating the supervised projection task. Results
remained strikingly similar across all periods, regardless
of the cases ending up in the training or testing sets,
thereby strengthening conclusions of uniformity in
pandemic policymaking.
Though exploratory, and not confirmatory in
motivation, the findings in this work could be explained,
at least in part, by path dependency, which is a
common feature of public and social institutions,
such as policymaking institutions broadly defined[32] ,
subnational policymaking[33] , higher education[34] , and
even Congress[35] . Indeed, Ref. [35] demonstrated that
political conflict can be an important driver in pushing
institutions to break from path dependency. As such,
and taken with the findings presented throughout this
current work, the lack of political conflict surrounding at
least the recognition of a need for policymaking at some
level, regardless of the scope of that action, could be the
driver behind the stability in patterns of legislating in
response to COVID-19. Put differently, the ubiquitous
presence of a common threat in COVID-19 may be
resulting in unification, at least as a motivastor for
policy and political mobilization. Thus, in the American
context, Congress sees the threat, and on the basis of
the representational arrangement, acts by leaning on
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the historical safety and path dependence of processing
similarly situated legislation. Though often cast in a
negative light, such as an impediment to progress or
needed policy change[36] , perhaps path dependency in
this unique historical moment presents an avenue to
bypass polarized, ineffective policymaking that so often
defines Congress.
To be sure, this targeted expectation was not explicitly
tested in the current work. Yet, whether some event
or context like COVID-19 can give rise to stable
policymaking and so undermine the negative effects of
polarization and ineffective governance is a question
worth addressing in future research.
Future, future work might pick up on these results by
considering either different periods of political history,
different substantive topics (e.g., the economy, elections,
and so on), as well as different governments around the
world beyond the American case.
On the technical side, future work might pick up on
the methodological approach (UMAP), but relaxing the
strong assumption that all observations exist along a
common manifold. A common manifold may not capture
reality, where different data generating processes may
result in actors in a common space acting fundamentally
different from others. Such an extension of UMAP
would be akin to anomaly detection, but in the context of,
e.g., deriving multiple manifolds from a common space
to explain such sparsity.
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